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Making bad decisions: firm size and investment under uncertainty
The stylised facts of firm size are few.  Firstly, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)
exhibit a much higher incidence of death than large companies (LCs).  Table 1 shows that a
figure of 50% survival after five years is fairly robust across European countries and years of
birth.  The obvious explanation is that SMEs are unable to diversify their investments as
widely, and this failure to spread risk causes higher volatility.  In effect, the divisions of LCs
are equivalent to smaller firms, and the profits of these divisions are not perfectly correlated.
Furthermore, LCs are better able to absorb the effect of a loss in one section of the firm
through their stronger financial position. The death rates of SMEs result then from a higher
volatility of return compared to the firm’s overall financial resources.
Table 1: Survival of newly registered or newly established enterprises










Source: Bank of England, 1999.
The second key stylised fact of firm size concerns growth rates.  Gibrat’s Law – that firms’
growth rates are independent of firm size – has been shown to be empirically unsubstantiated,
e.g. Evans (1987), Hall (1987) and Dunne & Hughes (1994). These results are particularly
strong among smaller sizes of firm, where the growth rate appears to be highest.
Few studies have explicitly attempted to explain this phenomenon. Cabral (1995) models the
investment choices of firms as depending on sunken costs: since small entrants are more
likely to exit (and lose the sunk costs) than large entrants, they invest more gradually and
hence experience higher growth rates. Cabral & Mata (1996) extend this analysis to include
the impact of learning-by-doing (improving the efficiency and thus survival rate of longer-
lived firms) and financing constraints (which bind more tightly on smaller, younger firms).
In models which fit the stylised empirical facts, the size distribution of firms has generally
been derived either from an underlying distribution of managerial abilities (following the
static model of Lucas, 1978) or from a process of firms learning about their abilities from
noisy production signals (Jovanovic, 1982).  Cooley & Quadrini (1999) present a model
which generates some of the stylised facts of firms’ investment and production behaviour
through heterogeneity of firms in terms of the amount of equity held. However, none of the
work done has managed to combine the distributional characteristics of firms’ size and
investment, with the key stylised fact of small firms – their high death rates.
Analysis of firms’ finances has provided perhaps the most convincing explanations of
differences in firms' performance by size and age.  Fazzari et al's seminal (1988) paper on the
determinants of firms' investments highlighted the importance of current period cashflow,
and spawned a body of literature using this as evidence of the existence of financialQEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS39 - 3 -
constraints.  These constraints have been argued to be the driving force behind the different
investment and growth patterns of SMEs, as opposed to larger companies.
The debate about the interpretation of these results has been moved on most usefully by
Kadapakkam et al. (1998).  They find that smaller firms’ investment level is less sensitive to
cashflow than that of larger firms. However, they do not interpret this as implying that
smaller firms can access capital markets most easily. Instead, since larger firms can be more
flexible in the timing of their investments and can wait for the availability of internal funds,
the cashflow-sensitivity of their investments will be higher and those of smaller firms
relatively less so.  The model of Pratap & Rendon (1998) leads to poorer firms’ borrowing
being an increasing function of their financial position, while this position is reversed for
wealthier firms.  This finding supports the view of Kadapakkam et al that smaller firms are
less able to be flexible about their timing, since they borrow more as soon as they are able to.
In this paper, I aim to model the abilities of firms of different sizes and ages to be flexible in
their investment timing, and the resultant quality of the investments undertaken.  The model
is based on the ‘real options’ theory of investment under uncertainty, but crucially
incorporates the assumption of a financial market characterised by asymmetric information.
The main innovation of the model is that it differentiates between firms on the basis of the
time available to them for making investment decisions. In this way it models relatively
constrained decision-making by small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) compared to
large companies (LCs), as the result of asymmetric information problems in financial markets
and hence a lack of available time in which to analyse investments.
SMEs therefore exhibit higher volatility of investment returns.  High death rates of SMEs can
be explained in terms of the inability to wait before taking an investment decision, and the
resultant higher uncertainty which characterises their decisions. It is not in fact the decision-
making processes of SMEs which are ‘bad,’ but rather the level of constraints on their
decisions which is high.  The empirical observation of higher growth rates among smaller
firms has interesting implications for the model, which are discussed.
Two previous papers within this project have laid the foundations for the model of SMEs’
investments which will be presented here.  Cobham (1999a) found that the availability of
financing could affect not only the level but also the nature of SME technology investment.
Cobham (1999b) built on this paper to create a life-cycle model of SMEs’ financing and
investment, where different types of financing are optimal for different types of investment at
different stages of the cycle.  The present paper assumes technology is embodied in an
investment (although the effect of innovative strength is considered), and focuses instead on
the impact of changes in financial markets on general investment levels.  Table 2 outlines
some findings from the previous papers, which will be used as a basis for discussion of the
differences between sizes of firm throughout the paper.Table 2: Typical positions of small
and large firms
1
                                                
1 NB. The values reflect the relative attributes of typical small and large firms. There does exist a category of
highly innovative, high growth small firms whose access to financing is wider than suggested. However, for the
vast majority of small firms, Table 2 is a reasonable representation.QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS39 - 4 -
Small firm Large firm
Financing
           Credit history Short, weak Long, strong
           Successful rounds None/one Many
           Credit risk rating Low High
           Accessible finance Bank debt Bank debt, public equity,
corporate bond market
Investment assessment
            Information access Low High
            Managerial expertise Low High
The paper is organised as follows.  Section I explains the real options approach to investment
under uncertainty, and sets out both a basic model and a variation using a different definition
of uncertainty.   Section II then focuses on the differing extent to which the investment
decisions of different sizes of firms meet the conditions necessary for application of the real
options approach, and delineates the algebra of the distinction.  The model is then applied in
section III, and the key results outlined. Section IV then considers the model’s policy
implications and derives recommendations for the particular case of Southern Europe’s
technology-based smaller firms.
I. The real options approach to investment
Investment under uncertainty – a summary
Dixit & Pindyck (1994) characterise firms’ opportunities to invest as analogous to a call
option.  That is, the opportunity, like the financial market instrument, grants the right, but not
the obligation, to make a given purchase at a given price within a given time period.  The
option is described as being ‘in the money’ when the price per share under the option is less
than the current market value - i.e. if the owner exercised the option and sold the shares
immediately back to the market, she would be ‘in the money.’ The focus is therefore on when
the value of the option will be maximised, or most deeply ‘in the money.’
The opportunity to invest is not explicitly purchased as the financial instrument is, but the
costs of identifying the opportunity are analogous to the option price.  The firm must have
made some commitment – of time and effort at least – to have reached a position where it can
consider making the investment.  There are three key criterion for an investment decision to
be suitable to the options approach: the investment must be at least partly irreversible, its
future returns must be subject to some uncertainty, and the investor must have the ability to
wait.  The extent to which these conditions are met for different sizes of firm will be
discussed in section II.
The potential value of waiting and gathering more information about, e.g., expected future
demand and supply conditions in a market, or the rate of change of relevant technologies, is
in the form of reduced uncertainty of the investment when it is actually made, and is
equivalent to an opportunity cost of investing.  There is a trade-off between this value, which
is foregone when the investment is made, and the value of the investment itself.
The option is only exercised when it is ‘deep in the money’ - the net present value (NPV) of
the investment is sufficiently large that the value of waiting for more information isQEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS39 - 5 -
counterbalanced.  This calculation is in stark contrast to ‘naïve’ use of the discounted
cashflow methods (such as the NPV) which analyse the value of investment decisions in
terms of estimates of future cost and revenue flows, as if with certainty; or with no possibility
of delay.
The key finding of Dixit and Pindyck’s approach is that, unlike static discounted cashflow
analysis, for sufficiently high levels of uncertainty there will exist a real, positive value to
waiting and gathering further information.  The value of not exercising the option is positive
when uncertainty over the outcome will be diminished by choosing not to exercise the option
at that precise moment, but delaying the investment to accumulate information.  That is, the
internal rate of return (IRR) of the investment must exceed not just the nominal interest rate
(i) but its sum with the option value (o): IRR=i+o.  Thus an option to invest, which by simple
discounted cashflow methods would seem to be ‘in the money’ (i.e. IRR=i), should not
always be exercised.
A basic real options model
The basic case to consider is that raised by McDonald & Siegel (1986), who studied the
optimal timing of paying a sunk cost I for a project of value V, where V follows a geometric
Brownian motion. Specifically:
dV Vdt Vdz = + s …(1),
where dz is the increment of a Wiener process, and a  and s  are drift and variance
parameters, respectively.  Equation 1 implies that the current value of the project is known,
but future values are lognormally distributed with a variance that grows linearly over time
[var(V) = 
2 s t ]. The function trends upwards over time, according to the first term on the
RHS, but the firm’s uncertainty over market conditions (s ) increases the deviation of the
path from its drift path (determined by the parametera ).
The project has payoffs equal to the value in the chosen period net of the investment cost.
The value of the investment opportunity, denoted by F(V), will be maximised in terms of the
payoff at some unknown time T by:




subject to equation 1 for V and where  r is the discount rate.  Because V is a stochastic
process, it is not possible to determine the time T; instead the investment rule will generate
some critical value V* such that investment is optimal for 
* ‡ V V . A key feature of the real
options approach is that V* can be two or three times as large as I for reasonable parameter
values, as Dixit & Pindyck (1994) show, while for a net present value decision rule, V*=I.
It is assumed that a r <  (the firm’s discount rate exceeds the drift parameter), since
otherwise the integral in equation 1 could be made indefinitely larger by choosing a larger T,
and hence waiting longer would always be preferred so no optimum would arise.  By defining
d r a = - , this assumption becomes d > 0.QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS39 - 6 -
The dynamic programming solution is given by equations (3)-(6):
  ( )
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Equations (3)-(6) define the critical value of V which triggers the decision to make the
investment.  As this value follows its path (equation 1) over time, it may eventually reach this
critical value and the investment will be made. Although there exist considerably more
complex variations of this model, the basic intuition remains the same.
Using Dixit & Pindyck’s criteria for suitable investment situations, it is possible to argue that
not all investment decisions are equally well-suited to application of the model.  As will be
made clear below, there are good reasons for believing that the extent to which this
maximisation process can be followed will vary systematically with firm size.  First,
however, I outline a variant of the McDonald & Siegel model.
A variation: uncertainty as a function of time waited
This section outlines a variation to the McDonald & Siegel (1986) model.  Specifically, it is
useful to consider uncertainty as a function of the time available to the firm in which to
gather information. Equation 1 represented V as a geometric Brownian motion with drift, but
as has been said the literature on real options extends to rather more complicated functions.
Equation 1’ represents V as a generalised Brownian motion:
( ) ( ) dV a V t Vdt b V t Vdz = + , , …(1’).
Setting  ( ) a V t V , = a  allows the drift parameter to operate as in McDonald & Siegel’s model,
but a time-dependency may be incorporated into the underlying level of uncertainty as
follows:
( ) ( ) b V t W V , = s …(7),
where W denotes the time waited before investment.  Equations 1’ and 7 state that, while the
variance of V is again growing linearly with the time horizon, the value of the underlying
constant is a function of the time in which the firm was able to gather information prior to
investing.
Uncertainty,  ( ) s W , is reduced by the (time-consuming) collection of information, and so will
fall as waiting time (W) increases, in a standard exponential decay function.  The strength of
this relationship will be denoted by  s b , which itself depends on two factors.  Firstly,
managerial expertise (m) dictates the efficiency with which the firm uses information gainedQEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS39 - 7 -
during additional waiting time in order to reduce uncertainty.  Maximum expertise implies a
value for m of unity, minimum expertise a value of zero.
Secondly, the strength of the relationship between uncertainty and waiting time depends on
the speed of flows of information about market conditions to the firm (g ). Again, unity
represents maximum speed and zero the minimum.
2  s b  will determine the rate of the
standard (exponential) informational decay process with which marginal uncertainty
reduction from additional time waited falls, c is a scaling factor:
( ) s b g g s b
s W ce m m
W = = < <
- ; ; , 0 1 …(8)
Equation 8 shows the relationship between time waited and uncertainty, for a given firm
considering a given decision. Note that both the speed of information flow and especially the
level of managerial expertise are constants – for a given project, they do not change over
time.  Firms gain expertise through learning-by-doing, from one project to the next, but not
within a given project process.
II. Firm size and appropriateness of the real options approach
Firms’ ability to wait
This section will detail how the approach adopted differs from the simple real options model
outlined above. As has been stated, the real options approach requires investments to exhibit
three main characteristics: at least partial irreversibility (by way of a sunk cost), uncertainty
about future values, and the ability of the investor to wait.  It is a key characteristic of SMEs
that their ability to wait is significantly less than that of LCs.  Greater constraints on SMEs,
through relatively less obtainable financing reduce their potential waiting time.  This reduces
their ability to eliminate uncertainty over investment prospects, and thus forces them into the
position of making ‘bad’ decisions – ‘bad,’ that is, in so far as they are relatively more
constrained.
This results in greater uncertainty of investment returns, and therefore explains the observed
higher volatility of smaller firms’ investments, and their higher death rates.  The ‘insufficient
diversification’ argument for SME death rates made earlier is based on the variance of returns
which SMEs are relatively less able to diversify. The approach here shows instead how
smaller firms face higher absolute volatility of any given investment.
On the face of it, the real options approach is well suited to the case of SME’s technological
innovation investments (with which we are particularly concerned), where uncertainty over
future revenues resulting from the investment will be great and the SME lacks information
about developing market conditions.  However, firms will be differentiated by one of the key
criteria for application of the real options approach - the extent to which they are actually able
and willing to wait; and this difference makes the real options approach less important than
the net present value method in many cases.  The ability to wait is tempered by the risk firms
face of losing their investment option through a financial market channel. This risk
encapsulates the differences between SMEs and LCs under the Dixit-Pindyck approach.
                                                
2 NB. This information flow speed is concerned with the flow of (primarily public) information about industry-
and economy-wide conditions for the firm’s market.  Private information enters the firm’s maximisation
differently, as will be seen below.QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS39 - 8 -
A firm cannot be considered to own a call option on an investment until it actually has a
guarantee of funding which will allow it to exercise the option when it is sufficiently in the
money.  The value of a call option to buy shares in, say, Intel at $1 each, is in effect limited
by the number of shares the owner can afford.  In the case of a small firm with limited assets,
a short track record of success and little credit history, financing cannot be expected to be
available continuously.
That is, while a bank may be willing to lend today, the SME cannot rely on the offer staying
open for any great length of time.  Banks are not given to making indefinite offers of finance,
and if they are assumed to ration credit to SMEs (see Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981), then a SME
granted access to finance in any given time period may randomly fall into the ‘rationed’
category when next it requests finance.  The risk that an offer of financing will be withdrawn
increases the costs of waiting; indeed under certain conditions the cost will reach the point
where waiting time is so limited that the use of a static (net present value) approach is
appropriate.  A large company, on the other hand, is likely to have a track record of success
and a long history of financing.  These factors send strong signals to potential financiers and
make the prospects for the future availability of financing much more stable, and thus reduce
the risks, and hence cost, of waiting.
The same arguments can be applied to equity financiers as to banks.  Cho (1986) and de
Meza & Webb (1987) show that rationing disappears in the original Stiglitz-Weiss model if
entrepreneurs are able to access an equity market.  However, Myers & Majluf (1984) and
Greenwald, Stiglitz & Weiss (1984) present different models in which equity rationing is a
feature. More recently, Hellman & Stiglitz (1995) have shown that credit and equity market
rationing are compatible.
3
If banks and equity financiers are considered rational, then arguably waiting and gathering
more information on the investment should not prejudice firms’ chances of receiving funding.
Indeed, if potential financiers act in awareness of the Dixit-Pindyck approach, they should
realise that the firms are improving their chances for success.  Even if financiers did adjust
their supply schedules to take this into account, however, the existence of rationing on the
basis of incomplete and asymmetric information would still generate the possibility for losing
financing.  For smaller firms in particular, where a decision to provide finance may have been
long awaited, there will exist an incentive to take what is offered and not risk a reversal of the
decision at a later date.
Whereas LCs with long credit histories and track records of success may consider a window
of finance which extends into semi-perpetuity, for SMEs this window may open only at
certain times, with certain financiers, and thus the potential costs of waiting are higher.
                                                
3 NB. This result relies on entrepreneurs having informational advantages about both the expected return and the
risk of the project.QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS39 - 9 -
Financial risk
Financial risk ( f r ) represents the risk of losing the investment opportunity due to financial
market imperfections and problems of informational asymmetry.  f r  depends on the
interaction between two factors – the information contained in the firm’s financial history and
the informational efficiency of the financial market in which the firm operates. The extent of
credit rationing in a market will depend on these two factors, since they represent the firm’s
ability to cheaply and effectively transmit credible information to financial markets, and the
financial market’s ability to cheaply and effectively use information about a firm to assess its
creditworthiness.
A financial market’s informational efficiency reflects how well information is managed by
the market, and thus how flows of information from the firm are used. The firm’s financial
transparency encompasses its financial history and its level of accounting.  The former
signals to financial markets the firm having previously been a good risk.  It indicates the
extent to which the market’s informational inefficiency will reduce the firm’s prospects of
obtaining financing, since this depends on the informational asymmetries relevant for the
firm and a long and successful history with repeated rounds of financing will effectively
reduce information problems.
Financial history reflects the length of the firm’s successful trading (its age), asset value (as
collateral or indicator of depth of resources) and previous rounds of financing – these may
each send strong signals about the firm’s creditworthiness. The accounting standard of the
firm affects the credibility of the financial data which the firm provides to the financial
market.
Let  fm d  and  ft d  represent the level of ‘perfection’ of the financial market and the firm’s
financial transparency respectively, defined between zero and unity where zero represents
complete ‘imperfection’ and unity perfection.  As either of these factors tends to zero (i.e. the
firm’s financial position becomes more precarious), the risk of losing the investment option
due to these imperfections is increasing.  The strength of the firm’s financial position is a
product of these imperfections, and is denoted by:
f fm ft b d d = . where  0 1 < < fm ft d d , …(9)
The more imperfect the financial market’s informational efficiency and the firm’s financial
transparency, the closer is  f b  to zero – the greater the effective imperfection and hence the
associated risk.  To complete the picture, it is useful to examine the growth of risk over time.
Consider a small, young firm with little track record or credit history.  It perceives a risk of
losing the option to invest which escalates rapidly from some point where financing has been
agreed throughout the process of gathering information.  The slope of this risk function will
be declining in the later stages as the risk reaches unity.  After being initially ‘rationed in,’
the firm’s risk of not having financing rises sharply as they must choose to wait and thereby
expose themselves to going through the lottery of rationing again.
After the first rise, risk continues to increases but only slowly – the incremental effects of
moving further from the point of being ‘rationed in’ are relatively small. Even a large firm
with an established credit history and successful track record will face an increasing risk of
losing the option through financing, as long as there is some uncertainty over the availabilityQEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS39 - 10 -
of future debt, equity or retained profits for investment. Finally,  f r  is bounded at unity, so
the following form is specified:




1 ln b …(10).
III. Operation of the model and key results
Financial risk as a time constraint on the real options approach
Figure 1 illustrates how different values of  f b  drive the growth of risk over time waited.  It
shows the path of risk where f b = 0.25,  f b = 0.5 and  f b = 0.75. The dotted horizontal line
provides an example of a risk threshold, where firms are assumed to be uniform in their
attitudes to risk.
4  Given such a threshold – a refusal to wait when the risk of losing the option
by doing so is fixed (in this case at 50%) - the division of firms according to their ability to
wait is immediately clear.
A firm with  f b of 0.25 – i.e. a small, young firm in a less efficient financial market, e.g.
Greece – will exhibit an ability to wait which is approximately one third that of a firm with
f b of 0.75 – i.e. a large, well-established firm in a stronger financial market, e.g. Germany.
This risk in equation 13 forms a constraint on firms’ ability to wait.  The way this is
expressed here is to assume that firms have some threshold level of risk, a critical level at
which they will not tolerate further waiting. The risk of losing financing rises over time, and
one of two scenarios will emerge.  Either the value of the investment reaches V* and the firm
makes its investment on a real options approach basis, or at some point, the level of risk
becomes too much for the firm to continue waiting, and at this point they take a net present
value investment decision.
This generates a solution of the following form: each firm’s maximum waiting time, W*, is
determined as the time at which their risk function (equation 10) reaches the threshold risk
level,  f r
*  - which is where:







The firm then faces a two part decision. If, within the resultant maximum waiting time, the
value of their investment exceeds V* then the investment is made in accordance with the real
options approach – the solution is again given by equations 3-6. Note that the variance
parameter has been respecified as a function of time waited, however, and substituting
equation 8 into equation 6 gives:
                                                
4 Risk-neutrality is the general assumption of the investment under uncertainty literature, and implicitly a
uniform attitude.  Such assumptions may be less appropriate here, so firms’ attitudes to risk will be considered
explicitly below.QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS39 - 11 -
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If the value of the investment does not reach V* within the time the firm has available to wait,
however, they are forced to make an investment decision at W*.  In this case, without the
ability to wait, the decision becomes once more suitable to the application of NPV methods.
The firm’s decision concerns the expected value of V and no longer takes account of the
possible value of waiting since waiting is no longer feasible. However, the uncertainty
associated with the future values of V – the resulting volatility of investment returns - is set
by the firm’s characteristics and the waiting time W*.
Investment scenarios for small and large firms
Figure 2 depicts the possible scenarios for two firms which face the same competitive risk
(i.e. have the same drift parameters) but different financial risks – i.e. their (identical)
threshold level is reached at different stages. The maximum waiting times for each firm are
simply those from the example given in Figure 1.
Scenario 1: Both firms make investments by the ‘real options’ approach
For a low value of V*, i.e. below the smaller firm’s threshold waiting time  s V , both firms
make the investment on a real options basis. If the function V had no trend variable, the
chances of finding this situation might be considered proportional to the ratio of the small
firm’s threshold time to the large firm’s; however, the function grows over time, so even this
ratio would overestimate the chances of such a situation.  In any event, when this case occurs,
the firms make the same investment, but crucially, with different levels of uncertainty about
the returns.
The relationship between uncertainty and time waited before investing contains a firm-
specific variable, and this variable will exhibit a positive relationship with firm size
(according to the relative abilities to assess investment set out in Table 2 in the introduction).
When both firms invest according to the real options approach – i.e. 
* V V s £  - the smaller
firm still faces higher values of uncertainty, and hence higher volatility of returns.
Scenario 2: small firm invests by NPV, large firm by ‘real options’
The next scenario is that  L s V V V > >
* , where the critical value occurs between the threshold
waiting times of the two firms.  In this case, the smaller firm has been forced to make an
investment decision at its threshold waiting time, while the larger firm – by virtue of being
able to wait longer – can make a more informed decision.
The smaller firm invests according to the NPV decision rule: this states that the firm will
invest when the value of the investment exceeds the cost, I.  Since V* may be two or three
times greater than I for “reasonable parameter values” (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994, p.136), there
remains a high chance that the investment will be made even though V has not reached V*.
As is apparent from equations 3-6, the size of the wedge between the NPV decision rule
(V*=I) and the real options rule is increasing in uncertainty, s , and this will increase the
likelihood of the investment being made.QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS39 - 12 -
Two important results can be inferred. First, smaller firms invest first.  Although larger firms
are more likely to make the investment – that is, they will make the investment while the
small firms’ decisions may be negative – the smaller firms are making the decision (to invest
or not) in a substantially shorter time, perhaps half.  Second, the small firm faces greater
uncertainty about its investment returns.
Scenario 3: both firms invest by NPV
The second possibility when 
* V V s > , is that the critical value does not occur during the
larger firm’s waiting time threshold either.  In this case, the larger firm makes a net present
value decision at its own W*.  Although both firms are applying the same decision rule, the
smaller firm is making its decision after a much shorter period of time and hence with greater
uncertainty and a greater spread between the investment cost I and the real options critical
value V*.  The smaller firm is therefore more likely to invest.
Key results
Over each scenario, then, the effect of the risk of losing financing for investment options is
two-fold – smaller, younger firms will (i) make investment decisions more quickly, and (ii)
face higher volatility in their investment returns, than larger, older companies.  The latter
effect is responsible for the key stylised fact of small firms, their high death rates: the greater
volatility of the smaller firms’ investments will result directly in higher death rates. This
effect will be compounded by the standard explanation discussed in the introduction, the
relatively shallow finances of SMEs (compared to LCs) relative to their investment exposure.
To explain the higher growth rates of smaller firms requires further research, but it would
seem to imply that ‘Scenario 3,’ where smaller firms are more likely to invest than larger
firms, dominates the other two (in which smaller firms are less likely to invest).  In other
words, this implies that larger firms too are often restricted from fully following the real
options approach by the frailties of financial markets. Both sets of firms are constrained then,
but the effect is to produce a higher investment rate among smaller firms and hence they
invest systematically more than their larger rivals.
The Cabral (1995) finding – that small firms invest in smaller stages, as a response to sunk
costs, thus causing higher growth – is also consistent with the model’s results, as long as the
size of the investments is proportional to the size of the firm when the comparison is made
here. In other words, the investments of smaller firms (which are more quickly decided upon
in this model) must represent smaller stages of an investment than those of larger firms.
IV. Some policy conclusions and directions for further research
A broader example
It is helpful to consider an example which covers a wider range of firms and financial
markets. Consider firms of three sizes, operating in financial markets of three different
efficiency levels.  In particular, consider a small, young firm, a medium-sized firm with (say)
a 5-year track record of success, and a large company with (say) a 10-year history.  Next,
consider a firm in each of these categories operating in the following financial market
settings: a highly developed and relatively efficient financial market, e.g. the USA, aQEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS39 - 13 -
developed financial market with relatively greater inefficiencies, e.g. France, and a less
developed financial market in a Southern European country, e.g. Portugal.
Based on the typical firm characteristics of different sizes of firm given in Table 2,
reasonable values for the variables which make up uncertainty and financial risk are given in
Tables A1-A3 in Appendix A, and Figure 3 shows the resultant values.
5 Figure 4 graphs the
maximum waiting times (for a risk threshold of 50%) and illustrates clearly the problem
which faces smaller firms operating in less developed financial markets.  The combination of
relatively small size and relatively underdeveloped financial market structure make SMEs in
Southern Europe doubly weak.
Because of financial markets’ asymmetric information characteristics, firms are distinguished
by their ability to wait.  As a result, firm size is a key determinant of both the speed of the
investment decision, and of the volatility of investment returns. Smaller, younger firms in
general, and especially those from weaker financial markets such as Southern Europe, face an
inability to wait which greatly exacerbates their investments’ volatility.  European economic
and monetary union will have two particular effects on the banking sector, which will act in
different directions.
Firstly, there will be a ‘skill’ effect: the consolidation of the banking sector should lead to a
higher average standard of informational efficiency (though not necessarily market
efficiency). This will reduce the rationing problems which generate the high death rates of
SMEs.  On the other hand, the ‘size’ effect may act in the opposite direction: Berger et al.
(1997, p.34), for example, find that “larger bank mergers are in general associated with a
decrease in small business lending.”
Equity market changes may have more unambiguously positive effects. Clearly any ‘size’
effect through the growth of individual European bourses, and the establishment of new pan-
European trading floors (e.g. Euro-Nasdaq) should increase the potential for venture capital
flows to smaller, younger firms.  The ‘skill’ effect should also operate to reduce rationing , as
in the banking sector.  However, the strong caveat remains that most small firms are simply
not the high growth candidates for venture capital that such changes will impact.
Policy conclusions
The model presented here leads to policy conclusions of two distinct types.  On the one hand
are policies to mitigate the key factor driving different waiting times - financial market
inefficiency. On the other hand there are policies to mitigate the effects of imperfect financial
markets.  In the first group, policies are primarily concerned with the efficient use and
provision of information from firms to the financial market.  On the market side, the trends
are positive.  Costs of information transfer and storage, and data manipulation are lower than
at any time in the past.  The market is involved in a process of streamlining risk management
procedures which should  (ultimately at least) lead to superior evaluation and monitoring of
risks.
                                                
5 NB. To avoid entering the arguments about the relationship between firm size and innovation capacity (see,
e.g., the debate between van Dijk et al., 1997, Brouwer, 1998, and Mendeveld & Thurik, 1999),  in d  is set to 0.5
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On the firm side, firms’ ability to collate and transfer credible information requires attention.
The old adage that Portuguese firms keep three sets of books – one for the tax authority, one
for the bank and one with the real figures – is a dangerous indicator.  Policies to encourage
improved accounting standards, e.g short-term subsidies to firms or a joint scheme with
accountancy organisations to expand their client base among smaller firms in particular,
might be the most effective means to address the problem.
The second set of policy conclusions is concerned with reducing the impact of smaller firms’
time constraints.  This can take two main forms – either reducing the differential in
competitive risk and hence drift parameters of investment values, or reducing the differential
in firms’ uncertainty about their investment returns by enabling them to make better use of
time waited.  The first of these involves altering not the difference in waiting time of firms of
different sizes, but trying to ensure that the relatively more time-constrained firm does not
also have an inferior chance of obtaining the critical value V* in any given time period.  The
policies this suggests are primarily concerned with the firms’ ability to generate and maintain
private information flows.  Specifically, this calls for an end to public R&D campaigns, for
example, or the non-commercial business support institutions which form part of national
strategies for improving innovation and competitiveness.  The model implies that generating
freely available information may well have a negative impact on investment by driving down
the value of firms’ options, through increased competitive pressure.
The final set of policies is that concerned with improving firms’ ability to reduce uncertainty
over time.  This involves increasing either the level of managerial expertise within firms,
through improved training or support institutions, or the flow of information about market
conditions to firms.  The implied generation of public information might seem at odds with
the previous recommendation, but if policy is considered to favour private information where
firm-specific factors of the investment decision are concerned, but public information
provision or support where general investment and industry-specific factors are involved, the
conflict is resolved.  Again, for the latter, the trend in the speed of flows of information is
positive.
Avenues for further research
Firstly, empirical research should be carried out to assess the strength of the model’s
predictions.  This should include not only testing to see whether observed distributions of
firm size can be generated for reasonable parameter values, but to what extent changes in
levels of investment can be predicted for different sizes and ages of firm. Simulations to
establish patterns of firm death should also be undertaken. The second aim of research should
be to ascertain the relative values of differences (generated by firm size and age) in
uncertainty and financial risk. In terms of the causality between financial market
development and economic growth, financial market characteristics could perhaps be shown
to drive the formation of industrial structure, and hence relative levels of economic growth.
An outstanding issue is the different way in which the availability of debt and equity act on
the decisions of firms of different sizes.  The extent to which the financial risk argument of
credit rationing applies to equity investors such as venture capitalists as well as banks has
been discussed here, although further work in this direction might yield interesting results –
for example, applying the two-dimensional asymmetric information model of rationing
proposed by Hellman & Stiglitz (1995).QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS39 - 15 -
In particular, the relative attractiveness of debt and equity to different sizes of firm should be
examined.  Since the costs of uncertainty (borne by smaller firms especially) will be
mitigated by equity as opposed to debt financing, the model implies a greater relative
preference for equity among smaller firms. This in turn suggests a role for third-party non-
market equity investors, but the supply side of the market for this form of financing has not
been sufficiently explored. The question of rationing should therefore be investigated, along
with the likely impact of investment on firms’ managerial expertise and incentive structure.
An issue which has not been dealt with here is that of competitive pressure on firms.
Hartman (1972) and Abel (1983) found that increased uncertainty can raise investment levels
(as seems to happen here with smaller firms), through a positive impact on the value of a
marginal unit of capital to a competitive firm.  Empirical findings suggest strongly however
that this effect is dominated by the option value effect acting in the opposite direction by
making investment less attractive (see Carruth et al., 1998, for a useful survey of results). In
particular, the level of competitive pressure on a firm seems to influence the effect of
uncertainty. Future work should address this issue.
Finally, the next paper in this project will consider explicitly and in more detail the impact of
EMU on the financial markets accessed by Southern European SMEs.  This will be combined
with both the model of their investment decisions presented here, and the results of surveys
conducted in Portugal, Greece and Spain.  A better understanding of the role of financial
markets in firms’ investment decisions will allow the effects of the changing nature of those
financial markets to be fully examined.QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS39 - 16 -
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Figure 1: Risk changing over time waited, for firms of different sizes
Figure 2: When firms invest – real options or no options
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Figure 4: Maximum waiting times for different financial risks, ( f b )
Key: po indicates firms from ‘Portugal,’ fr firms from ‘France’ and us firms from the ‘USA;’
the numbers 1-3 refer to the relative size and age of the firms as defined in the text
(1=smallest).  “Bf” is  f b .
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